Theorist of Maritime Strategy by J.J. Widen

Author:J.J. Widen [Widen, J.J.]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: History, Oceania
ISBN: 9781317010968
Google: 5dCXCwAAQBAJ
Publisher: Routledge
Published: 2016-02-17T16:13:04+00:00

1 Corbett, Some Principles, pp. 16–17 and 85–87. The idea that Corbett’s theory of war primarily can be interpreted as a reaction to the Napoleonic principle of overthrow can be found in Baugh, untitled book review, Naval War College Review, p. 131. This account is a review of the Naval Institute Press edition from 1988 of Corbett’s Some Principles.

2 “Lectures on Naval Strategy by Julian S. Corbett”, CBT/31, Corbett papers, National Maritime Museum, London.

3 Corbett, Some Principles, p. 18.

4 Corbett, Some Principles, p. 18.

5 Corbett, Some Principles, p. 18.

6 Corbett, Some Principles, pp. 20–21.

7 Corbett, Some Principles, pp. 20–21.

8 Corbett, Some Principles, p. 22.

9 Echevarria, Clausewitz and Contemporary War, p. 73.

10 Clausewitz, On War, translation from 1976, p. 605. For a similar interpretation of Clausewitz’s view of war as a continuation of political intercourse, see Robert E. Osgood, Limited War: The Challenge to American Security (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1957), pp. 21–23. For an interesting critique of Clausewitz’s “political philosophy of war”, see Anatol Rapoport, “Editor’s Introduction”, in Carl von Clausewitz, On War (London: Penguin Classics, 1968), pp. 11–80.

11 This argument can be found in Martin van Creveld, “What is Wrong with Clausewitz?”, in Gert de Nooy (ed.), The Clausewitzian Dictum and the Future of Western Military Strategy (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1997), pp. 19–20. Quotations are from ibid.

12 For a critical view of Clausewitz’s application of ends and means in war, see van Creveld, “What is Wrong with Clausewitz?”, pp. 18–20.

13 The Italian field marshal Raimondo Montecuccoli (1609–1680) was probably one of the first military theorists to use the conceptual distinction between offence and defence. See Gat, A History of Military Thought, pp. 15–26.

14 “Lectures on Naval Strategy by Julian S. Corbett”, in CBT/31, Corbett papers, National Maritime Museum, London. See also Corbett, Some Principles, pp. 31–32. Compare with Clausewitz, On War, translation from 1976, pp. 357–358.

15 Corbett, Some Principles, p. 32. Compare with Clausewitz, On War, translation from 1976, p. 358.

16 Corbett, Some Principles, pp. 32–34.

17 Corbett, “Notes on Strategy”, p. 329.

18 Corbett, Some Principles, pp. 34–35. Compare with Clausewitz, On War, translation from 1976, pp. 357–358.

19 Corbett, Some Principles, p. 36.

20 Here Corbett is in accord with Castex, a military thinker usually thought of as an exponent of the great value of the offensive in naval warfare. However, Castex argued that in some cases when the defender was able to force the attacker “to come and fight him on known ground where he had prepared positions more solid than those of his moving adversary”, the uncertainty usually characterising the defence disappeared and the defender had the advantage of surprise “in the form of counterattacks”. But this was, according to Castex “an exceptional case” and, in general, surprise favoured the attacker. See Raoul Castex, Strategic Theories (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1994), selections translated and edited with an introduction by Eugenia C. Kiesling, p. 313.

21 Found in Heuser, Reading Clausewitz, p. 93.

22 Castex, Strategic Theories, pp. 311–313.

23 Castex, Strategic Theories, p. 322 (emphasis in original).

24 Castex, Strategic Theories, pp.

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